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actions necessary to provide adequate 
confidence that an item or product conforms 
to established technical requirements. 
(2) A set of activities designed to evaluate 
the process by which products are 




(1) The degree of confidence required in the 
correctness of a particular process or tool. 
(2) The planned and systematic actions 
necessary to provide adequate confidence 
and evidence that a product or process 
satisfies given requirements. 





Software assurance is the planned and 
systematic set of activities that ensures that 
software processes and products conform to 
requirements, standards, and procedures. 
‘Processes’ include all of the activities 
involved in designing, developing, 
enhancing, and maintaining software; 
‘products’ include the software, associated 
data, its documentation, and all supporting 









The application of engineering and 
management principles, criteria, and 
techniques to achieve acceptable mishap 
risk, within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, 
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A. EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND AEROSPACE 
SOFTWARE 
There are many reasons for software evolution. Seacord, Plakosh and Lewis [1]  
identify three categories of evolution: (i) maintenance, (ii) modernization and (iii) 
replacement.  They describe maintenance as small changes that are typically corrections 
to software faults or minor enhancements.  Modernization involves major changes to a 
system, but which preserve a significant amount of the old system.  Modernization may 
take the form of retargeting old software to a new hardware platform; revamping the 
human machine interface to improve usability; component substitution, such as with 
alternate commercial products; source code translation to new versions of the same 
language or different languages to that previously used; code reduction to remove unused 
functionality or re-factor remaining functionality; and functional transformation to 
achieve structural improvement.  Replacement involves adopting a completely new 
design for a system when the old system cannot be modernized in an effective manner. 
Seacord, Plakosh and Lewis go on to identify complexity, software technology 
and engineering processes, risk, commercial components, and changed business 
objectives as challenges to modernization.  Leveson [2] identifies the appearance of new 
hazards, an increased exposure to software-intensive systems, greater amounts of energy 
being monitored or controlled by software, and an increased reliance on software for 
monitoring and control of systems as further challenges to software maintenance.  
Additional challenges experienced in the military domain include the need for high 
degrees of inter-operability with external systems; national and international rather than 
personal or commercial security concerns; and a harsh operating environment (i.e., 
combat) in which the system must continue to operate. 
Military aerospace systems are examples of software-intensive systems that 
exhibit many of the aforementioned challenges.  Such systems are costly to produce and 
take many years to develop.  For example, consider the following timeline for the Boeing 




1970s  Predecessor design (Northrop YF-17) proposed as an Air 
Combat Fighter for the United States Air Force.  (F-16 chosen 
instead). 
1975 Modified design (F-18) accepted as a Naval Air Combat Fighter 
for the United States Navy (USN) and Marine Corps (USMC). 
1970/1980s Variant designs for Attack (A-18) and Trainer (TF-18) versions 
developed but eventually merged to become the F/A-18A single-
seat and F/A-18B dual seat versions. 
1978 & 1979  First flights of an F/A-18A & B respectively. 
1980-1988  F/A-18A & B aircraft delivered to USN and USMC. 
1982-1988  CF-18A & B aircraft delivered to Canadian Forces – Air 
Command. 
1984-1990  AF/A-18A & B aircraft delivered to Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF). [7] 
1986-1990  EF-18A & B aircraft delivered to Spanish Air Force. 
1987-2000 F/A-18C & D delivered to USN and USMC. 
1991-1993 F/A-18C & D aircraft delivered to Kuwait Air Force. 
1992-2008  Upgrade of Spanish Air Force EF-18A & B aircraft. 
1995-2000  F-18C & D aircraft delivered to Finnish Air Force. [8] 
1996-1999 F/A-18C & D aircraft delivered to Swiss Air Force. 
1997  Delivery of F/A-18D aircraft to Royal Malaysian Air Force. 
1997 Merger of the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas companies. 
1999 onwards  Upgrade of USN and USMC F/A-18A, B, C & D aircraft. 
2002-2010 Upgrade of RAAF F/A-18A & B aircraft. [7] 
2002-2009 Upgrade of Canadian Forces – Air Command CF-18A & B 
aircraft. [9] 
2004-2008  Upgrade of Swiss Air Force F/A-18C & D aircraft. 
2007-2014 Upgrade of Finnish Air Force F-18C & D aircraft. [8] 
2015 Planned withdrawal of RAAF AF/A-18 aircraft. [10] 
2017-2020  Planned withdrawal of the Canadian Forces – Air Command CF-
18. [9] 
2020 Planned withdrawal of Spanish Air Force EF/A-18 aircraft 





Military aircraft are not alone in their long life and continual upgrade.  After three 
years of initial design work on the original design, the Boeing 747-100 design was 
accepted in 1966 and entered service in 1970.  In the forty years since then, four other 
significant variants and thirteen minor variants have been or are being built [11].  The 
delivery of the latest 747-8 aircraft is conjectured to last twenty years from a planned 
service date of 2009.  It is conceivable that these aircraft will be flown for twenty years 
beyond final delivery.  While the last design will be substantially different from the first, 
this represents around eighty years of evolution. 
The F/A-18 timeline above only includes four major variants of the F/A-18 
without mention of the different configurations of equipment and software for the eight 
nations that utilize this aircraft.  Nor does it include the three F/A-18E/F/G variants 
which some consider to be substantially different from the earlier variants of the aircraft.  
The timeline above reveals an approximately thirty year life to date and around fifty years 
total for development, maintenance, and modernization from the conception of the F/A-
18 to its planned final disposal.  Two dominant reasons for changes to aircraft are new 
mission requirements and technology improvements, such as the addition of an attack 
role as well as the air combat role for the F/A-18, and the availability of new equipment 
such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) or new weapons such as the 
AIM-9X air-to-air missile.  Given the long development time and service history of 
aircraft, many changes to an aircraft design can be expected over its lifespan.  
Furthermore, the considerable amount of previous expenditure on an existing aircraft 
invites modernization of the existing platform before purchasing a new aircraft.  Unit 
costs of F/A-18A & B aircraft have been reported between USD28-35 million. 
A critical enabler for variants and upgrades of all aircraft is software.  The 
collection of Operational Flight Programs (OFP) in the many different processors of the 
F/A-18 is collectively called a Software Configuration Set (SCS).  Some of the SCS that 
have been developed or are currently in development or planning for the F/A-18A/B/C/D 
include 89C, 91C, 92A, 09C, 10A, 11C, 12A, 13C, 15C, 17C, 18E, 19C, 21C, 23C, 25C.  
Some of these SCS were integral to the hardware upgrade programs that were listed in 




platform.  In addition to this list of SCS, there are also different versions of some of the 
above SCS for different international customers, for example, 15C for the USN and 
USMC but 15CA for the RAAF; and at least two countries outside the United States 
(U.S.) are both maintaining and modernizing the SCS that they receive to meet their own 
unique requirements and priorities.  The 15C SCS is a recent software development that 
demonstrates many of the challenges to software modernization.  The 15C SCS was 
delivered in 2001 after four years of development.  This SCS started out with seventy-
five high-level Statements of Requirements to be completed in three builds and ended 
with 134 Statements of Requirements delivered over four builds.  The final product 
integrated three new weapons and five new major avionics systems.  The 15C SCS has 
over ten million source lines of code (SLOC), across more than forty processors and uses 
twelve languages in the aircraft with a further two in the development environment which 
itself has four million SLOC [12].  Several computer processors in the F/A-18 required 
upgrading, forcing retargeting of the OFP to run on them.  Replacement color displays 
and the integration of the JHMCS have enabled a revamping of parts of the human 
machine interface. 
B. SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE CERTIFICATION 
An essential part of developing safety-related aerospace software that is expected 
to be operationally fielded is to comply with the airworthiness design requirements 
specified by the certification authority.  Examples of airworthiness certification 
authorities include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for civilian aviation in the 
U.S., the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for military aviation in Australia, and the 
Naval Air Systems Command for USN and USMC aviation.  Airworthiness design 
requirements address the acceptable level of confidence required in the safety of all parts 
of the aircraft system:  hardware, software and the human operators (sometimes referred 
to as “skinware”).  Software system safety requirements address those parts of a system 
for which software is identified as the source of, detector of, or means of containing a 
system fault, regardless of the locus of the fault.  “Certification is normally based on the 






assurance standard for the development of safety-related aerospace software is the Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-178B ‘Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification’ [14]. 
Obtaining an appropriate return on investment (ROI) is an understandable 
expectation for the acquirer of any system.  The considerable amount of resources it takes 
to develop a large aerospace system necessitates a relatively lengthy time of system 
operation in order to recoup this investment.  The system will change over time to 
account for one or more of the following: corrections to design faults or implementation 
flaws in the previous system, adaptations of existing system functions to accommodate 
changes in environment or operations, or completely new features that meet previously 
infeasible or unimagined requirements.  One element for consideration when modifying 
software is to maintain at least an equivalent level of assurance as that for the initial 
development.  However, legacy software previously developed to standards such as 
DOD-STD-2167A or MIL-STD-498 may not have included adequate provision for 
software assurance that would meet today’s standards.  As such, a desirable goal during 
software modification is to upgrade the previous certification basis by addressing the 
objectives of a contemporary software assurance standard such as DO-178B [15].  
Applying DO-178B guidance to the development of new software requires considerable 
effort at safety levels of higher integrity, but is relatively straightforward when compared 
with the re-certification of legacy software to DO-178B that did not have the DO-178B 
guidelines applied during the previous software development. 
Developers may choose to improve their software development processes when 
modifying legacy software in order to achieve certification to a new software assurance 
standard.  When an applicant seeks re/certification, the certification authority takes into 
account whether the evidence provided by the software development team sufficiently 
addresses the software assurance objectives, activities and considerations.  The level of 
confidence one has that the modified software deserves certification against a new 
software assurance standard should increase each time the legacy software is further 
modified and re-certification is subsequently achieved, ceteris paribus.  This approach to 




However, re-certification of software to a new software assurance standard may 
be built upon legacy software that in some fundamental way does not warrant 
certification to a new standard of level.  Whilst the improved processes applied during 
modification address the modification itself and any identified interfaces to non-modified 
software, the processes may not address the fundamental system safety properties of that 
part of the underlying legacy software that is not addressed in the modification or is not 
identified as interfacing the modified areas.  This approach to re-certifying legacy 
software raises the following question:  Could legacy software be fundamentally flawed 
in areas that are left unmodified during software evolution and result in unwarranted 
certification of software to a new software assurance standard? 
C. UNDERLYING CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Legacy Software 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term legacy software means software that has 
been previously developed and is subject to modification, that is, both maintenance and 
modernization.  More specifically, it is software that has been developed to a defined 
standard, or through a defined process, so that the software has a known pedigree, but a 
pedigree that is not currently desirable.  It is recognized that this is a narrow definition 
and does not, amongst other scenarios, include the reuse of software in a new application 
without first being modified. 
2. Software Safety within System Safety 
MIL-STD-882D has the following definition for safety: 
Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational 
illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment. [16] 
Leveson defines safety in a manner consistent with this absolute point of view as 
“freedom from accidents or losses,” but recognizes that this is not achievable for real-
world systems, especially those systems that are complex.  Absolute safety is, however, 
the goal that should be the starting point from which judgments about acceptable levels of 
mishap risk are made.  Leveson goes on to make the case that safety is a system property 
that has a contribution from software whenever software is involved in a system.  The 




The application of engineering and management principles, criteria and 
techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk within the constraints of 
operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout the system’s life cycle. 
This definition and its nearly identical predecessor in MIL-STD-882C start out 
with a provisional view of system safety that is a function of system effectiveness and 
development schedule and cost. 
Roland and Moriarty [17] state that the following as the concept for system 
safety: 
… involves a planned, discipline, systematically organized, and before-
the-fact process characterized as the identify-analyze-control method of 
safety. 
In both of the preceding definitions, system safety is assumed to be reliant on the 
process by which a system is developed; that is, system safety does not simply happen by 
chance, but is instead part of system design.  However, just having a development 
process does not guarantee that a system will be safe (whatever your definition of safety).  
The process must be suitable, rigorous, complete and actually used to develop a product 
that can be regarded as relatively safe with some degree of confidence in the assertion of 
safety. 
The application of system safety engineering focuses on the early identification 
and analysis of hazards which in turn permits the system developer to mitigate them 
through system design.  This is the preferred method of treating systems hazards.  The 
alternative is late identification of hazards which forces either the treatment of hazards 
through the less desirable procedural and training mitigation measures, or the costly 
rework (in time and money) to incorporate design mitigation measures. 
Software is an abstraction and as such, it has no substance and cannot directly 
harm people, property or the environment.  However, software can be responsible for the 
loss.  The opportunity for software to contribute to loss is enabled through its use by 
system developers to sense and control physical components within a system and its 
environment; the physical components can release energy that can harm someone or 




the software, hardware, operator and external factors.  Leveson provides the following 
definition of software system safety that is consistent with this perspective: “Software 
System Safety implies that the software will execute within a system context without 
contributing to hazards” [2]. 
3. Software Assurance 
The ADF Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual describes software 
assurance in the following terms: 
Software assurance is the planned and systematic set of activities that 
ensures that software processes and products conform to requirements, 
standards, and procedures. ‘Processes’ include all of the activities 
involved in designing, developing, enhancing, and maintaining software; 
‘products’ include the software, associated data, its documentation, and all 
supporting and reporting paperwork. [14] 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard Glossary of 
Software Engineering Terminology does not define software assurance but does have an 
entry for software quality assurance which refers readers to quality assurance which 
states: 
(1) A planned and systematic pattern of all actions necessary to provide 
adequate confidence that an item or product conforms to established 
technical requirements. 
(2) A set of activities designed to evaluate the process by which products 
are developed or manufactured. [18] 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) does define 
Software Assurance, and does so in terms from the IEEE Standard Glossary [18], but 
adds that NASA’s definition includes the disciplines of software quality, safety, 
reliability, and verification and validation: 
The planned and systematic set of activities that ensure that software life 
cycle processes and products conform to requirements, standards, and 
procedures. [19] 
NASA elaborates on this definition of software assurance by introducing 





Software assurance is an umbrella risk mitigation strategy for safety and 
mission assurance of all of NASA’s software.  The purpose of software 
assurance is to assure that software products are of high quality and 
operate safely. 
Assure is used when software assurance practitioners make certain that the 
specified software assurance, management, and engineering activities have 
been performed by others. 
Finally, for plain English definitions of assurance, the following are taken from 
Wiktionary: 
(1) The act of assuring; a declaration tending to inspire full confidence; 
that which is designed to give confidence. 
(2) The state of being assured; firm persuasion; full confidence or trust; 
freedom from doubt; certainty. [20] 
Based on the preceding definitions, one can conclude that the aim of software 
assurance is to provide confidence that the software complies with all of its requirements 
(e.g., functional, safety, reliability) and that software assurance is distinct from other 
software development activities.  In some cases software assurance activities require an 
independent oversight to justify the non-independent claims of software assurance. 
4. Mission Hazards 
An additional consideration for military systems is mission-worthiness.  If part or 
all of a combat military system’s (e.g., tank, ship, aircraft) self-defense mechanisms is 
inoperable, the system will be subject to additional mission hazards that are a part of the 
combat environment, for instance, loss of lives and equipment through destruction or 
capture.  Unacceptable consequential losses may also be incurred by either of the 
combatants if a military system’s offensive capability is faulty or inoperable, such as 
failure to destroy an enemy may result in subsequent loss of friendly forces, or 
inaccuracies in targeting may increase collateral damage and loss.  These examples do 
not fit the contemporary view of safety hazards, but rather operational or performance 
failures that have hazards as an indirect consequence.  However, due to the dire 
consequences of some operational or performance failures in a combat environment, 
application of the techniques that assure safety of software can also be applied to the 




























II. SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE STANDARDS 
A. EXAMPLES FROM THE AEROSPACE DOMAIN 
The focus of this thesis is the application of DO-178B as it is the preferred 
standard for software assurance for safety-related airborne software in the ADF.  This is 
not to say that alternative standards do not exist or are unacceptable.  In the aerospace 
domain, software-related standards in use include: 
RTCA DO-178B ‘Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification’ in conjunction with an acceptable system/software safety 
standard for civilian aviation in the U.S. 
MIL-STD-498 ‘Software Development and Documentation’ in conjunction with 
MIL-STD-882D ‘Standard Practice for System Safety’ for military 
aviation in the U.S. 
DEF STAN 00-55 ‘Requirements for Safety Related Software in Defence 
Equipment’1 produced by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
NASA-STD-8739.8 ‘Software Assurance Standard’ for the development of 
aerospace software within NASA 
ECSS Q-80B ‘Software Product Assurance’ by the European Space Agency 
B. EXAMPLES FROM OTHER DOMAINS 
Aerospace software is just one safety-critical domain that requires standards for 
software development and/or assurance.  Other domains and the standards proposed for 
them include: 
EN 50128 ‘Software for railway control and protection systems’ and IEC 62279 
‘Software for railway control and protection systems’ for the development 
of software in the railway domain 
IEC 60880 ‘Software for computers in safety systems of nuclear power stations’ 
and IEC 62138 ‘Software aspects for computer-based systems performing 
category B or C functions’ for application to nuclear power station 
software 
IEC 60601-1-4 ‘General requirements for safety - Collateral Standard: 
Programmable electrical medical systems’ for software in the medical 
equipment domain 
                                                 





ISO/TR 15497 ‘Road vehicles – Development guidelines for vehicle based 
software’ and the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association 
(MISRA) Report 2 ‘Integrity’ for software in the road vehicle domain 
The following list of standards has been proposed for general use, rather than 
being identified for application in a single domain: 
IEC 61508 ‘Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related systems’ 
ISO/IEC 12207 ‘Information technology – Software life cycle processes’ 
ISO/IEC 9126 ‘Software engineering – Product quality’ 
ISO/IEC 14598 ‘Software engineering – Product evaluation’ 
ISO/IEC 90003 ‘Software engineering – Guidelines for the application of ISO 
9001:2000 to computer software’ 
C. RTCA DO-178B – SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS IN AIRBORNE 
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION 
1. DO-178B Fault Condition Categories and Safety Levels for Software 
DO-178B was developed in collaboration with the European Organisation for 
Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) which published the document as ED-12B with 
the same title.  The RTCA is not an officially sanctioned authority, and as such, DO-
178B is not mandatory for use within the U.S..  However, DO-178B is highly regarded 
within the aviation community and is the preferred software assurance standard for 
safety-related airborne software by the FAA and ADF.  DO-178B pertains to the 
assurance and certification of all software requirements, not just safety-related software 
requirements, but does make specific mention of the safety-related requirements that are 
imposed on aerospace software by the system safety process. 
Before the guidelines of DO-178B can be applied, a system safety assessment 
process (not included as part of DO-178B) is used to determine the sources of any safety-
related requirements and the failure condition categories associated with them.  Two 
system safety standards that may be used for this purpose are MIL-STD-882C [21] and 
the SAE ARP4754 [22].  Safety-related requirements are allocated to the various sub-
systems during the system safety program.  Those requirements that have been allocated 
to software as the source, the detector or the method of fault containment, are allocated a 




of software from the following list in Table 1.  For example, the flight control sub-system 
would very probably warrant a failure condition category of catastrophic (as determined 
by the system safety program) and hence the software component of the flight control 
subsystem would be developed as safety level A software. 
 





No Effect E2 
Table 1. RTCA DO-178B Safety Categories and Software Levels 
The allocated safety level then determines the following:  which subset of 
activities must be conducted, the degree of rigor to be applied to the activities, whether 
the assurance of them needs to be conducted independently from development, and the 
control category for data management of the software products.3 
2. DO-178B Objectives, Activities, Considerations and Evidence 
DO-178B is an objective-based standard that specifies the objectives for three 
categories of software lifecycle processes; the three categories are planning, development 
and integral processes. For each process, DO-178B defines: 
a. Activities to achieve software life cycle objectives, 
b. Design considerations to support software lifecycle objectives, and 
c. Evidence that demonstrates that software lifecycle objectives have been 
achieved. 
DO-178B also identifies by safety level what control should be placed on the data 
items produced and whether an objective and activity should be conducted by parties 
independent of the software development. 
                                                 
2 Level E software does not require the application of any DO-178B activities, considerations or 
evidence. 
3 Use of the term ‘software product’ within this thesis is synonymous with ‘software artifact’ and 




In total, DO-178B lists sixty-six planning, development and integral objectives 
that are applicable to software assessed as being safety level A.  For safety level D 
software, a subset of only twenty-eight objectives are required.  The complete set of 
objectives are listed in Annex A of this thesis, and grouped as listed in Table 2.  Numbers 
in parentheses indicate the number of objectives that are required to be independently 




A B C D 
Planning 7 7 7 2 
Development 7 7 7 7 
Verification 40 (22) 39 (11) 32 8 
Configuration Management 6 6 6 6 
Quality Assurance 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (2) 2 (2) 
Certification Liaison 3 3 3 3 
Total 66 65 57 28 
Table 2. Breakdown of Objectives by Lifecycle Process and Safety Level 
As can be seen, the greatest number of objectives for software safety levels A, B 
and C are verification, totaling nearly two-thirds of the objectives required for each of 
these safety levels.  The verification activity spans the range of software development 
activities.  Planning, development, configuration management, quality assurance and 
certification liaison objectives are almost uniformly applied across safety levels A 
through D. 
3. Circumstances for the Application of DO-178B 
In addition to being applied to the development of original software, DO-178B 
may be applied under any of the following circumstances: 
a. Software that was previously developed and certified to DO-178B and is 
to be modified and certified to the same safety level as previously 
achieved 
b. Software that was previously developed for a different aircraft installation 




c. Software that was previously developed using a different development 
environment or developed for a different application environment 
d. Software that was previously developed to different standards or 
guidelines, such as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software, a different 
standard, or to DO-178B but to a different safety level. 
A note to section 2.2.3 of DO-178B provides the following advice regarding 
software modification: 
The applicant may want to consider planned functionality to be added 
during future developments, as well as potential changes to system 
requirements allocated to software that may result in a more severe failure 
condition category and higher software level.  It may be desirable to 
develop the software to a level higher that that determined by the system 
safety assessment process of the original application, since later 
development of software life cycle data for substantiating a higher 
software level application may be difficult. 
The use of DO-178B during software evolution is not without its problems.  
Johnson identified literal interpretation of the current standard and incorrect application 
of its predecessors, DO-178A and DO-178, as areas of concern. 
Challenges in using DO-178B are already occurring. They include the 
discovery that previously certified systems didn't necessarily use earlier 
versions of DO-178 correctly and now result in greater transition issues. 
Literal interpretation remains a problem. [23] 
D. MIL-STD-498 – SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 
This section presents a brief description of the software requirements specified in 
MIL-STD-498.  MIL-STD-498 is chosen as a representative legacy software standard 
because of the prevalence of military aerospace systems still in operation today that were 
developed in accordance with (IAW) this standard. 
1. Background and Scope of MIL-STD-498 
MIL-STD-498 was developed to resolve the objections to MIL-STD-2167A 
Defense System Software Development and to merge its contents with those of 7935A 
DoD Automated Information Systems Documentation Standards, thus forming a single 
best-of-both standard that was consistent with other Department of Defense policy and 




One of the significant changes to the requirements in MIL-STD-498 was an 
attempt to be independent of any particular development methodology.  The standard 
provides considerable guidance for application to the grand design, incremental design, 
and evolutionary design development methodologies as an example of the proposed 
flexible use of the standard.  Another deliberate change from earlier standards was a 
recognition that software product data could and should be provided in alternative forms 
to traditional documents, in fact advocating the use of natural work products rather than 
development of additional documents as evidence of activities and results. 
Attempting to merge weapon system software and information system standards 
led to a document that has a number of requirements that have little or no relevance to 
airborne software, for instance, a software center operating manual.  This situation does 
not present a problem as MIL-STD-498 repeatedly advises that the requirements of the 
standard should be tailored to suit the particular software development project.  Guidance 
and instructions for tailoring are provided in each of the general and detailed 
requirements and in the associated Data Item Descriptions (DID).  The standard also 
makes reference to the general tailoring guidance in MIL-HDBK-248 Acquisition 
Streamlining. 
2. MIL-STD-498 Process and Product Requirements 
Approximately thirty general and detailed requirements and approximately 
twenty-nine types of software products are described in MIL-STD-498 which references 
the content in the twenty-two accompanying DID for specific information.  Development 
processes that are required by the standard include: 
a. Participation in system-level activities (requirements through to testing), 
b. Software requirements analysis, design, and implementation, 
c. Verification, integration, testing and corrective action, 
d. Configuration and risk management, metrics analysis, quality assurance, 
reviews, audits, and 




Software development products are introduced and briefly described in the 
standard and more fully described in the accompanying DID.  The 22 DID specified by 
MIL-STD-498 include: 
a. Plans for the conduct of software development activities 
1. Software Development Plan 
2. Software Test Plan 
3. Software Installation Plan 
4. Software Transition Plan 
b. Specifications of system, software and software 
1. System/Subsystem Specification 
2. Interface Requirements Specification 
3. Software Requirements Specification 
4. Software Product Specification 
c. Descriptions of concept, designs, tests and delivered software 
1. Operational Concept Description 
2. System/Subsystem Design Description 
3. Interface Design Description 
4. Software Design Description 
5. Database Design Description 
6. Software Test Description 
7. Software Version Description 
d. Manuals for users and support personnel 
1. Software User Manual 
2. Software Center Operator Manual 
3. Software Input/Output Manual 
4. Computer Operation Manual 
5. Computer Programming Manual 
6. Firmware Support Manual 
e. Software Test Report to record, report and explain the results obtained 
from software testing 
The standard stresses the use of natural software products, not additional 




documents, to remove the temptation to only consider them as traditional documents.  
The standard encourages alternative mediums for records such as data within computer-
aided software engineering tools, and substitution by commercial manuals where 
applicable. 
Whilst MIL-STD-498 makes the statement that it “invokes no other standards,” it 
leaves specific details for some of the software-product content to related standardization 
documents such as ANSI/IEEE Std 1008 Standard for Software Unit Testing, or requires 
the developers to create and follow their own standards, such as “standards for 
representing requirements, design, code, test cases, test procedures, and test results.” 
3. MIL-STD-498 and Safety Requirements 
Safety is regarded as one of three specific “critical requirements” along with 
security and privacy.  However, safety considerations are left very short on detail about 
how to satisfy them and make no distinctions for varying degrees of safety level.  The 
treatment of safety within MIL-STD-498 is largely limited to the section §4.2.4.1. 
4.2.4.1 Safety assurance. The developer shall identify as safety-critical 
those CSCIs or portions thereof whose failure could lead to a hazardous 
system state (one that could result in unintended death, injury, loss of 
property, or environmental harm). If there is such software, the developer 
shall develop a safety assurance strategy, including both tests and 
analyses, to assure that the requirements, design, implementation, and 
operating procedures for the identified software minimize or eliminate the 
potential for hazardous conditions. The strategy shall include a software 
safety program, which shall be integrated with the system safety program 
if one exists. The developer shall record the strategy in the software 
development plan, implement the strategy, and produce evidence, as part 
of required software products, that the safety assurance strategy has been 
carried out. 
§4.2.4.1 is a simple statement of what is required without providing any guidance 
to achieve it or issues to be considered when developing the required strategy and plan.  
The standard lists external standards to supplement the requirements of MIL-STD-498, 
these being MIL-STD-882 System Safety Program Requirements, MIL-HDBK-272 
Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Systems and IEEE Std 1228 
Standard for Software Safety Plans.  Treatment of safety in the various MIL-STD-498 




safety requirements should be singled out “for special treatment” in separate 
subparagraphs.  This is again done without any detailed requirements, guidance or 
considerations as to what special treatment entails.  The meager offering in §3.7 of the 
Software Requirements Specification DID (extract included in Appendix A) is as detailed 
as the requirements for safety get in the standard or any of its DID. 
4. MIL-STD-498 Software Product Evaluation and Quality Assurance 
Section 5.15 describes the evaluation processes for software products.  It 
distinguishes between in-process evaluations to be conducted by the developer, and 
evaluations associated with formal deliverables.  The standard states requirements for the 
independence of evaluations and the retention of records.  Appendix D of MIL-STD-498 
provides fourteen evaluation criteria for the twenty-nine software products that it 
identifies.  The evaluation criteria include the following types of considerations: 
a. Contains all the applicable information of the relevant DID 
b. Meets the Statement of Work and/or Contract Deliverables Requirements 
List if applicable 
c. Is understandable (by the target audience) 
d. Is internally consistent within a product 
e. Was developed IAW the software development plan 
f. Consistent with requirements at the system and software level 
g. Are feasible to implement 
h. Covers requirements, design, implementation etc. 
In-process software Testing (unit testing, unit integration and testing, Computer 
Software Configuration Item (CSCI)/Hardware Configuration Item integration and 
testing) do not receive the same treatment as formal qualification of CSCI and system 
testing.  In-process testing does not require testing personnel independence from 
development personnel and does not provide any guidance for evaluation criteria beyond 
the term ‘adequate.’  The ADF Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual has the 
following statement regarding the adequacy of MIL-STD-498. 
While many of the objectives under RTCA/DO-178B have placeholders in 
MIL-STD-498, there are no criteria that can be used to assess the 
adequacy of completion of the activity. For example, there is a 




define when testing can be considered complete. Therefore MIL-STD-498, 
in isolation, does not provide an adequate basis for software assurance 
and, by itself, is not recognized by the TAR as a software assurance 
standard. [14] 
Software Quality Assurance of process and product is covered in section 5.16 of 
MIL-STD-498 (extract included in Appendix A).  The purpose of this process is to ensure 
that activities are carried out; that the respective software products are produced and 
evaluated; and that identified problems are recorded, analyzed and corrected or justified.  
The standard also requires that, quality assurance activities be conducted by personnel 
that are independent of the development and product evaluation activities, and that 




III. SOFTWARE EVOLUTION, CERTIFICATION AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH SOFTWARE STANDARDS 
A. SOFTWARE EVOLUTION AS REENGINEERING 
A useful representation of the steps involved during maintenance or 
modernization has been proposed by Kazman, Woods and Carriere [24].  The model in 
Figure 1 shows the multiple paths that software evolution may take from legacy code to 
new code. 
 
Figure 1. Model for Software Reengineering (From: [1]) 
The horseshoe model reveals a vertical path up the left side for understanding the 
software by reconstruction from less to more abstract software products; lateral paths 
across the model for code, functional and architectural transformations; and a vertical 
path down the right side for refinement from software abstractions to code.  It is not 
always necessary or desirable to travel the full path around the outside of the horseshoe.  




the only software product available from the legacy software development is the code, 
thus forcing a reengineering project.  At the other end of the software evolution spectrum 
is minor modification.  This may be achieved by a direct code transformation without 
attempting to reconstruct design and architecture. 
In all cases of software evolution, the developer makes a practical choice of 
starting point on the left, reconstructs only as much as is necessary (if any), then makes 
the transformation at that level, finally proceeding through the refinement process to the 
new code (possibly only a partial refinement intended to simply incorporate new 
requirements). 
B. SOFTWARE PRODUCT VERIFICATION 
There is debate within the software engineering community over the merits or 
otherwise of inferring the quality of fielded software code from the quality of the people, 
processes, and tools that an organization uses to develop software products.  It is 
generally accepted that whilst quality processes are a necessary enabler to produce 
quality code, processes alone are not a guarantee of quality code.  It is for this reason, that 
the bulk of software processes for safety-critical software are in fact the software product 
verification processes that include a wide range of activities from requirements 
verification through unit testing to final qualification testing.  Figure 2 [25] shows a 
taxonomy of the major types of verification activities that must be conducted on various 
software products.  The testing branch of the verification techniques can be broken down 
further into the following sub-types: 
1. Requirements-based testing that addresses the system and software 
functional and non-functional requirements 
2. Function-based testing that addresses the software design functions 
3. Structure-based testing that addresses the software implementation 
4. Data-based testing that addresses different categories of data inputs, e.g. 
random inputs, equivalent partitions, normal inputs, abnormal inputs and 
boundary values 
5. State-based testing for state-based software 
6. Probability-based testing to assess software reliability 
7. Fault-injection testing that uses prior experience to target likely sources of 





Figure 2 Verification Techniques (From: [25]) 
Given the practical impossibility of performing exhaustive testing, an important 
consideration for the verification of safety-critical software is the measure of coverage 
that is provided by the verification effort.  The quantity and type of verification that is 
performed on software will determine the level of assurance that can be ascribed to the 
fielded product. 
C. SOFTWARE EVOLUTION AND CERTIFICATION 
Recertification must be sought when significant hardware or software changes are 
made to an aircraft design.  MIL-HDBK-514 Operational Safety, Suitability, & 
Effectiveness for the Aeronautical Enterprise [26] provide the following instances that 
warrant recertification of airworthiness: 
1. Changes that affect propulsion/drive system operation (including software) 
2. Significant software revisions 
3. Modification to weapons release/firing system, including stores 
management system and associated weapons system software 
1. Using Deductive Logical for Software Certification 
Software certification is based on a conclusion that software meets its quality 
specifications.  In this paper, the quality specification of interest is safety; there are of 
course other quality objectives that exist, for instance security, which have their own 




achievable for present-day complex systems, the practical conclusion that is drawn is that 
a software product meets all4 of the software assurance objectives of an acceptable 
software assurance standard.  A conclusion should only be accepted as valid when it 
flows naturally from the premises upon which it is founded. 
The conclusion about software certification may be either positive (accepted) or 
negative (rejected) and in either case is based on one of the following implications: 
a. If all of the software assurance objectives are satisfied, then the software 
is certifiable IAW the accepted software assurance standard, or 
b. If any of the software assurance objectives are not satisfied, then the 
software is not certifiable IAW the accepted software assurance standard. 
What remains to be determined for this basis of a conclusion is a technique to 
establish which of the above propositions is true.  The following is a two-part proposal to 
achieve certification of evolved software: 
a. Acceptance or rejection of evidence that was produced during the prior 
development of the software that is to be modified, and 
b. Acceptance or rejection of evidence that is newly produced during the 
development of the evolved software. 
It is understandable that not all of the evidence presented from prior development 
will be accepted as meeting the objectives of a contemporary software assurance standard 
and in some cases will not even be applicable.  In the cases where the prior evidence is 
either inadequate or non-existent, new evidence will be required.  New evidence must 
also be produced for the parts of the software development that are unique to the 
modification of the software.  The focus of this thesis is a framework for determining the 
adequacy of the existing software products in support of airworthiness certification of 
evolving software. 
2. Establishing the Safety Level Assessment 
One of the early steps to be undertaken when commencing modification of safety-
critical software is to either establish or revise the safety level for the modified software.  
A valid assessment of safety level is important as it determines the activities that need to 
                                                 





be conducted and the evidence that will need to be presented to an airworthiness authority 
to achieve certification.  Assessing the safety level can be achieved in the first instance, 
by examining the existing system/software safety program outputs from the previous 
development.  When doing so, the assumptions made and analysis conducted for the 
previous development must be reviewed in the light of the proposed modifications, and 
then hazard identification and analysis must be conducted for the new requirements that 
are proposed.  If a system/software safety program was not conducted for the previous 
development, or the information is insufficient or unavailable for any reason, a complete 
hazard identification and analysis will need to be conducted.  The final outcome of this 
effort is the assessment of the failure condition category and requisite safety level for the 
modified software. 
3. Carrying Out Software Evolution 
Once the software level has been determined, development should proceed in a 
manner that facilitates the granting of an airworthiness certification.  What this means is 
that sufficient evidence must be produced throughout the life-cycle that demonstrates the 
successful completion of the software engineering activities that address the objectives of 
software assurance. 
4. Achieving Airworthiness Certification 
The final step to achieving airworthiness certification is the collation of the 
evidence that supports certification.  Two well known formats for this are the software 
accomplishment summary described in DO-178B or the safety case described in DEF 
STAN 00-55. 
D. SOFTWARE EVOLUTION AND STANDARDS 
The long time-frames over which aerospace systems are developed and then 
continue to evolve expose them to ongoing changes in software engineering.  This 
evolution of the discipline of software engineering is manifest in the new computing 
technologies, and the design, implementation and verification techniques that are 
developed to cope with the increasing complexity of modern software-intensive systems.  






domain is military acquisition reforms to reduce the number of military standards; efforts 
in this area aim to cancel rewrite or replace military standards with acceptable 
commercial-equivalent standards. 
Given the cost to develop safety-critical software for aerospace applications, a 
reasonable expectation during software evolution is to be able to reuse the products that 
were produced during the previous software development.  The challenge to achieving 
cost- and time-effective software reuse and the subsequent certification of the system 
containing the reused software is to identify the relationship between the activities and 
outputs of the previous development, and the activities and outputs required for the 
modification.  This thesis presents a model for identifying the necessary relationships to 
facilitate software reuse in support of the certification of evolving safety-critical software. 
The first version of software, version X in Figure 3, has a relationship R1, to 
standard S1, that meets or exceeds the requirements for certification IAW standard S1 at 
the time of development of X.  Software products must comply with multiple standards if 
no one standard provides all of the requirements needed for a software development 
project. Relationship R1 explicitly represents just the one standard of interest; for the 
purposes of this thesis the type of standard of interest is that of software assurance. 
 
Figure 3. Software Evolution and Standards Relationship 
The final set of software products that is produced during software development 
provides a complete definition of software version X in Figure 3.  However, it is only a 




compliment of this subset contains the additional products sometimes regarded as internal 
to the development organization but which are necessary enablers for the activities that 
complete the software development. 
Version X of the software also has a relationship R2, to the contemporary standard 
that is now preferred, but either was not available, or was not applied at the time of 
previous development.  This relationship exists from the moment that both standard S2 
and version X of the software both exist, but may be of little practical interest until the 
requirements of standard S2 are invoked for version X of the software.5 
Version X′ of the software has a relationship to version X (R3), which is the result 
of modification due to maintenance or modernization.  Some of the reasons for this 
modernization may be the addition of new features, removal of existing features, 
retargeting the software to new hardware or revamping of the interface.  Version X′ of the 
software also has a relationship R4, to standard S2, which is the focus of this thesis.  In 
order to achieve certification of version X′, relationship R4 must satisfy the requirements 
of standard S2 to the satisfaction of the certification authority.  Versions X′′ and X′′′ and 
relationships R5 through R8 are further iterations of the same principle for subsequent 
modifications of the software.  This model can also be applied to the introduction of a 
third software assurance standard, in which case second standard (formerly S2) would be 
represented by S1, and the third standard represented by S2.  Furthermore, the standards 
represented by S1 and S2 could be a different version of the old standard, for instance 
DO-178B and the pending DO-178C.  Using this construction of the relationships, the 









= ∆∪  
Equation 1. Software Evolution 
                                                 
5 Relationship R2 may never be invoked and in fact is unlikely to be invoked if version X does not 




tX∆  represents the modification introduced at each iteration of the software 
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Further development of an expression for software evolution in terms of the 
individual products to compose any given version requires an expression for software 
engineering that produces a single software version.  A description of such an expression 
follows next. 
E. ABSTRACT ALGEBRA AND MORPHISMS 
Before applying the concepts of abstract algebra to software engineering, we 
briefly review the theory of abstract algebra in its familiar mathematical domain.  In 
mathematics, all algebras are defined by a set of symbols A, and the set of operations Ω , 
that can be applied to the elements of A.  Two algebras are said to be similar if they have 
the same number of operations for each arity.  A purely hypothetical case would be two 
algebras are considered to be similar if they both have three unary operations, seven 
binary operations and two ternary operations.  Furthermore, two algebras are said to be 
homomorphic if there is a function that provides a one-to-one correspondence between 
every element of one symbol and operation set 1 1[A , ]Ω  and another symbol and 
operation set 2 2[A , ]Ω . 
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To illustrate this with a common example, consider the homomorphic function of 
logarithm that provides such a correspondence between multiplication and addition and 
the set of symbols (numbers) that are valid for logarithms.  One algebra R, is defined by 
the symbol set of all positive real numbers and the single binary operation of 
multiplication, that is { },R +⎡ ⎤= ×⎣ ⎦\ .  A second algebra L, is defined by the symbol set of 
all real numbers (negative and positive) and the single binary operation of addition, that 
is { },L ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦\ .  The reader might be tempted to propose that there are many other 
operations that could be performed on the elements +\  and \ , but those operations 
would be outside the definition presented here, and constitute a different algebra than 
either R or L.  Note also, that there is no requirement for the symbol sets A1 and A2 to be 
equivalent.  The two algebras R and L in this example are similar by virtue of each 
having only one binary operation.  Furthermore, algebras R and L are said to be 
homomorphic by reason of the function ( ) ( )logx xφ = .  For example: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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Equation 2. Homomorphism Example – Logarithms 
Another example of a homomorphic function is the Laplace Transform that 
permits convolution in the linear time domain to be represented as multiplication in the 
frequency domain. 
F. ABSTRACT ALGEBRA AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
The relationships in Figure 3 are composed of the products (symbol set) that are 




evolution.  Before applying the mathematical concept of homomorphism to software 
evolution and standards interoperability, we first specify the sets Α and Ω as follows: 
1. Α represents the set of all possible software products ( rα ) both used and 
created during software development, and 
2. Ω  represents the set of all possible activities ( sω ) that are conducted on 
the software products during software development. 
Some obvious examples of the products rα , in set Α are the Plans, Requirements, 
Infrastructure, Design, Source Code, Executable Code, Verification results.  Section 1.5 
of the IEEE Standard for Software Reviews [27] has a list of thirty-seven ‘software 
products’ with the inclusion of such items as ‘anomaly reports,’ ‘build procedures,’ 
‘installation procedures,’ and ‘walkthrough reports’ in addition to the previously 
mentioned products.  Examples of the activities sω , in set Ω  are Planning, Development, 
Verification, Configuration Management, Quality Assurance, Certification etc. for the 
various stages of software development. 
Using the algebraic representation for software development we can now write: 
( )
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Equation 3. Single Product Development 







⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 




Each of the products used in the software coding activity (which in this example 
is a quaternary operation) are themselves products of earlier software development 
activities, that is, planning, defining standards, choosing and qualifying tools and 
developing the software design.  Development tools also encompass configuration 
management and traceability systems in addition to the obvious tools such as text editors 
and compilers.  Design includes the software architecture and design-level software 
requirements.6 
While the source and object code are being produced by the software coding 
activity, other important products are also being generated.  These additional products 
include updates to traceability information and configuration management data in 
addition to the creation of feedback for the design and requirements activities in case any 
errors (e.g., conflicting requirements) are found in them as a consequence of carrying out 
the software coding activity.  Including these products into the representation expands the 
previous description of software development to that of Equation 5: 
( ) ( )
     where conducting activity ,
     on an appropriate subset ,
     that has been produced prior to activity ,
     produces the new subset of the software artifacts ,

















Equation 5. Single Activity 
Equation 5 specifies that the set of products that are produced (CS) by an activity 
is a proper superset of the products used (BS) during the activity.  This would always be 
the case, even in situations were some portion of the requirements, design or 
implementation is removed.  At the very least, the removed product should remain as part 
of the development history for the software. 
                                                 




The source code development example presented in Equation 4 is expanded to 
have the following relationships that demonstrate the production of multiple software 
products from a single software development activity: 
Development Plan Code
Coding Standards Traceability Data
Software Coding
Development Tools CM Data
Design Trouble Reports
→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 6. Single Activity – Coding Example 
The last step in the algebraic representation of software development is to 
represent the composition of all the development activities that together produce the 
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Equation 7. Software Development 
The last step in the algebraic representation of software development is to 
represent the composition of all the development activities that together produce the 
completed software package. 
G. ABSTRACT ALGEBRA AND SOFTWARE EVOLUTION 
Combining the representations in Equation 1 and Equation 7 provides the 
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Equation 8. Software Evolution 
It is desirable from a cost-benefit perspective that some of the products that were 
produced during previous software development be reused to achieve certification during 
software evolution.  In terms of the model presented in this thesis, this amounts to how 
much of the software product package Xn satisfies the relationship R2(n+1).  The greater 
the amount of previously developed products that can be reused is clearly an important 
business objective, but this must be achieved within the bounds of an acceptable level of 
software assurance to meet airworthiness requirements. 
In terms of the first iteration of software evolution, how much of the development 
for version X’, is available as reused software product from the development of version 
X, can be legitimately used to satisfy the relationship R4?  A promising answer to this 
problem lies in how much of the development for version X, that was used to satisfy 
relationship R1 could have been used to satisfy the relationship R2?  The next section of 
this chapter examines this question. 
H. APPLICATION OF MORPHISM TO SOFTWARE EVOLUTION 
The mathematical concept of homomorphism was introduced in §III.E in order to 
use it now as the basis for describing the correspondence of the products that constitute 
the relationships R1 and R2.  A function that transforms the products developed for 
version X and satisfies relationship R1, to products that satisfy relationship R2 can be 
used to identify the amount of reuse of existing software product that is available for 
certification of the evolved software.  Unfortunately, the definition of homomorphism has 
a single function that provides the mapping between two sets of similar algebra.  It would 




R1 to also satisfy relationship R2.  It would be perfect if such a function was an identity 
function and hence no additional operations or activities were required to achieve the 
desired correspondence.  This is highly unlikely given that standard S2 either did not exist 
or was not chosen as the basis for certification of the previous software development.  
Three likely scenarios for morphims to the products that satisfy relationship R1 to make 
them acceptable for relationship R2 are: 
1. Some of the existing products will be able to be mapped using an identity 
function, in which case no additional activity is required for them to be 
considered as meeting the requirements of S2, 
( )t tφ α α→  
Equation 9. Identity Morphism 
2. Some of the existing products will be able to be mapped using a partial 
function, in which case some rework or additional activity is required for 
these to be used to meet the requirements of S2, 
( )t tφ α δα→  
Equation 10. Partial Morphism 
3. Some of the existing products will not be able to be mapped using any 
function; or rather these products will be subject to a null function in the 
transformation.  In these cases, completely new work and software 
products will be required to satisfy the requirements of relationship R2. 
( )tφ α →∅  
Equation 11. Null Morphism 
Achieving effective reuse during airworthiness certification is a matter of 
maximizing the amount of products that can be found in the first two of these groups. 
Ensuring adequate airworthiness is a matter of ensuring that products that are in the last 
two groups are not mistakenly included in the first group. 
This concept of morphism is applied to the software coding activity in the 
following sections as an example for code generation.  The next section has an 




for safety-critical software are ensuring that software code and requirements are fully 
traceable in both directions, and that code has been verified as correct and complete.  
These aspects are described in the following paragraphs and presented in the 
( ) ( )s s sB Cω → algebraic notation. 
1. Previous Software Development 
The activity of software coding has plans, standards, tools and design as inputs to 
this process.  The chief product that is produced by the coding process (at least with 
respect to an executable product) is code.  Other products that are produced by the 
software coding activity are traceability data, configuration management data and trouble 
reports.  These are not necessary to produce an executable product and may be regarded 
by the code-centric developer as by-products of producing executable code, but they are 
essential to achieving the software assurance necessary for a certifiable product.  









Development Tools CM Data
Design Trouble Reports
→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 6. Single Activity – Coding Example 
For safety-critical software, it is necessary to verify that all low-level 
requirements have been met and to also ensure that there is no additional code that does 
not have a traceable link back to requirements.  Establishing traceability between code 
and design (i.e., low-level requirements) is a process that has as inputs to the process; 
code, design for that code, and development tools that permit traceability to be recorded.  




Code Traceability Code Traceability Data
Development Tools
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 




The purpose of software testing is to ensure that the software design has been 
implemented and does not contain errors.  The inputs to this process are the code itself 
and the verification tools that enable testing.  (For the sake of simplicity in this example, 
other inputs such as test scripts are considered to be part of the verification tools.)  The 
outputs from the testing process are the obvious test results, but also include traceability 






Test Logs and ResultsCode
Test Infrastructure Traceability Data
Software Testing
Test Plans, Cases and Procedures CM Data
Test Input Data Trouble Reports
→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 13. Software Testing 
This completes the description of the previous development of software products 
associated with the software coding and the additional activities necessary for 
certification of this small element of software development.  The next section describes 
the software coding and related activities for modification of the legacy software. 
2. Software Modification 
Plans, standards, tools and design are once again the inputs to the software coding 
activity.  However some of the activities undertaken and artifacts used during 
modification may not be the same as those for the legacy software development.  The 
plans and design used for software modification will likely be different to that used for 
the previous development, while the coding standards and development tools may or may 
not be the same as previously used.  In this example, it is assumed that the coding 
standards and development tools are in fact the same as that used for the previous 
development.  Furthermore, no distinction is drawn between the deliberate reuse of 
standards and tools and the unplanned reuse of the same that would be characterized as 
salvage rather than reuse.  New trouble reports, updated traceability data and 





As the software coding activity is being conducted for the purposes of 
maintenance or modernization and not replacement, the actual code produced during the 
Software CodingM activity is likely to be just a fraction of the total code that defines the 
final product.  These considerations are expressly represented in Equation 14.  In addition 
to the modified code, the code that is unchanged from the previous development must 
retain its traceability, correctness and completeness during the modification.  The final 









Development Tools CM Data
Design Trouble Reports
→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 14. Software Coding – Modification 
( ) ( )O MCode Code Code= ∪  
Equation 15. Software Code Evolution 
Carrying out the activity of code traceability is also going to be a process that 
considers both modified and unaffected software products.  In the same manner as for 
code generation, traceability data will be described by the union of outputs from both pre- 




Code Traceability Code Traceability Data
Development Tools
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 16. Code Traceability – Modification 
( ) ( )X MTraceability Data Traceability Data Traceability Data= ∪  





The same rationale applies to the software testing activity conducted for the final 
modified software and the description of configuration management data, trouble reports 
and test results that are produced by the activity.  These are represented by Equation 18 






Test Logs and ResultsCode
Test Infrastructure Traceability Data
Software Testing
Test Plans, Cases and Procedures CM Data
Test Input Data Trouble Reports
→⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟→⎝ ⎠  
Equation 18. Software Testing – Modification 
( ) ( )X MTest Logs and Results Test Logs and Results Test Logs and Results= ∪  
Equation 19. Software Test Results Evolution 
( ) ( )X MCM Data CM Data CM Data= ∪  
Equation 20. Software Configuration Management (CM) Data Evolution 
( ) ( )X MTrouble Reports Trouble Reports Trouble Reports= ∪  
Equation 21. Software Trouble Reports Evolution 
3. Software Product Morphism 
The previous two sections described a portion of the software development 
(software coding and related activities); first for previous software coding, and then for 
the subsequent modification of the code.  This section addresses which of the software 
products from this total effort of previous development and modification might be used to 
satisfy software assurance certification of the final modified software.  Some of the 
products from the previous development may be satisfactory, even if the currently desired 
standard was not met for the previous development.  It is likely however that at least 
some of the software product will not be acceptable for the current certification effort, 
even if the software assurance standard has not changed, this being the more likely 




a. Code Traceability 
We firstly deal with traceability between design and code, which we have 
asserted is one of the certification requirements associated with the software coding 
activity in order to meet a software assurance standard.  Equation 17 shows the two 
components that comprise the full code traceability for the final modified code; existing 
and modification traceability data.  Acceptance that the software modifications were 
carried out with the preplanned intention to meet a new software assurance standard, 
leads to a reasonable expectation that the traceability data generated for the modified 
segments of code will be acceptable.  Traceability between unmodified code and design 
may not be properly established after modification, especially if the traceability prior to 
modification is questionable; this element of traceability is explored further in the 
following paragraphs. 
Table 3 shows a simplified example that demonstrates some of the 
variations to code traceability as a consequence of modifications to code.  Columns one 
and two represent traceability between design elements and code units of the previous 
development, while columns one and three represent traceability between design 
elements and code units of the final modified software.  The implementation of design 
element ‘A’ is shown as traceable to code unit ‘M’ (and vice-versa) and remains 
unchanged by the modification.  The implementation of design element ‘B’ has been 
restructured by the modification and is now traced to the new code unit ‘R’ in addition to 
the previous code unit ‘N’.  Design element ‘C’ was implemented in code unit ‘O’ of the 
previous code, but has now been removed as a result of the modification.  Traceability 
information for design element ‘D’ is not shown for either the previous or the modified 
code.  The intention in this hypothetical example is that design element ‘D’ does exist as 
a necessary element of the design and is present in the software (as verified by 
requirements-based testing), but its traceability information was simply overlooked in the 
previous development.  Also for the purposes of this example, design element ‘D’ was 
not associated with or considered during the software modification which prevents 
anything being said about its traceability after the modification.  Code unit ‘Q’ is 




traceability to design.  Again, this reappears in the modified software because it was not 
specifically addressed as part of the modification.  Design element ‘E’ is a new feature 
that is introduced as part of the modification and is traced to code unit ‘S’. 
Design Element Previous Code Unit Modified Code Unit 




C O  
D ? ? 
? Q Q 
E  S 
Table 3. Modified Code Traceability 
Consider the final traceability data that is proposed to meet certification 
requirements in the two parts identified in Equation 17; firstly the later of the two parts, 
that which was generated during the modification, and lastly the earlier of the two parts, 
that which was generated for the previous development. 
( ) ( )X MTraceability Data Traceability Data Traceability Data= ∪  
Equation 17. Software Traceability Evolution 
In this example, the software modification was composed of three facets: 
(i) refactoring of design element ‘B’, (ii) removal of design element ‘C’ and (iii) addition 
of design element ‘E’.  It would be expected that the traceability data for design element 
‘E’ will be properly detailed as part of the modification effort and as such, satisfy the new 
certification requirements.  We propose that the new traceability for design element ‘B’ 
will also be complete after the modification, although this will be somewhat different 
from the traceability of design element ‘B’ for the previous development.  Traceability 





The traceability data from the previous development (Traceability DataX 
in Equation 17), even in this simple scenario, requires a morphism that is a composition 
of identity, partial and null morphisms.  Consider each of the design elements and code 
units in turn. 
The traceability data for design element ‘A’ for the previous development 
can probably be used as-is for the modified software.  In this case the identity morphism 
applies: 
( )X MA ATraceabilty Traceabiltyφ →  
Equation 22. Identity Morphism – Code Traceability 
The software developer would very likely use the previous design element 
‘B’ traceability data as a basis for establishing code traceability in the modified code.  If 
this is the case, the final traceability of design element ‘B’ will be a composite of the new 
traceability data to code unit ‘R’ with a partial morphism of the previous traceability data.  
This is represented in Equation 23. 
( )( ) ( )X N RB B B BTraceability Data Traceabilty Traceabilty Traceability Dataδ= → ∪  
Equation 23. Partial Morphism – Design Element ‘B’ Code Traceability 
The traceability data for design element ‘C’ for the previous development 
cannot be used for the modified software.  In this example, the design element and 
corresponding code unit have been removed from the modified software.  Traceability 
data for this portion of the software in the previous development is no longer applicable 
to the final modified code.  Furthermore, as it is not part of the modification (by 
omission), any latent reference to it in the final traceability data will be an error.  In this 
case the null morphism should apply as in Equation 24: 
( )XCTraceabiltyφ →∅  




Design element ‘D’ and code unit ‘Q’ do not have any identified 
traceability data from previous development and hence nothing can be said with certainty 
about their traceability after the software modification.  There is no traceability 
information for them and therefore nothing to subject to a morphism function. 
This example only focuses on a narrow aspect of traceability between 
design and code.  Traceability between other software products is also needed.  It is usual 
practice to have all of the traceability information collected into one traceability matrix or 
database.  In this case, the reader would appreciate that identification of existing 
traceability data for appropriate reuse becomes an increasingly complex problem with 
variation in the amount of partial morphism that would need to be applied to different 
software products. 
b. Software Testing 
The design elements and code units already presented in Table 3 are used 
again for the following analysis of test results for the modified code.  We again treat the 
latter of the two parts of the complete test results first, before discussing the reuse of 
previous development test results. 
( ) ( )X MTest Logs and Results Test Logs and Results Test Logs and Results= ∪  
Equation 19. Software Test Results Evolution 
We again assume that the testing of modified code satisfies the 
requirements for the new software assurance standard (and any unmodified code that may 
interface the modification).  This assumption equates to full acceptance of code unit R 
and S test logs and results, and partial acceptance or possibly full acceptance of unit M 
test logs and results.  What remains is to determine the suitability of the test results for 
the previous development that have not been covered as part of the modification.  N.B.:  
We assume here that the certification requirements placed on testing of the evolved 
software has changed and that this new standard is more stringent in its requirements. 
The degree to which test plans, cases, procedures, input data, logs and 




depend on the manner in which testing was conducted for code units N and R after 
modification of the software.  We believe it to be likely that test cases, descriptions and 
procedures would be completely redeveloped for the modification in all but the most 
trivial modification efforts.  This belief is based on the fact that design element B has 
been refactored across two code units and the effort required to plan and conduct 
completely new tests would be justified by comparison to the effort required to develop 
only some new tests but integrate them with reused existing tests and results.  This 
assumption is highly dependent on the amount of refactoring, but we believe that 
refactoring to include a second code unit would be significant enough to justify the 
assumption; under this assumption we propose that the morphism to be applied to 
existing test results for code unit N would be a null morphism.  Testing for code unit O, 
like traceability for it, has no bearing on the modified software and should also be 
subjected to the null morphism. 
( )XNTest Logs and Resultsφ →∅  
Equation 25 Null Morphism –Test Logs and Results 
As was stated in the previous discussion regarding code traceability, the 
code for design element D has been tested, despite not having traceability data to identify 
which code unit provides the implementation.  Test results could be obtained without the 
code unit identification by undertaking requirements-based integration testing.  However, 
as mentioned in §III.B, there are other testing techniques in addition to requirements-
based testing that we propose would be the requirements of the newly applied software 
assurance standard S2.  In this case the mapping of test logs and results for design 
element D will be the partial morphism. 
( )
DX M
Test Logs and Results Test Logs and Resultsδ →  




Once again, code unit ‘Q’ does not have any identified design element.  
Code unit Q is thus unlikely to have any test logs and results from the previous 
development and so again, there is nothing to subject to a morphism function. 
The preceding discussion pertaining to the reuse of prior development test 
logs and results only covered the issue of existence of the software products, not the 
suitability of the products that do exist.  An assessment of the adequacy of the previous 
test logs and results to meet the new standard would have to be made.  The measure of 
adequacy would include what class (timing/performance/loading etc.) of testing was 
conducted, what coverage was provided (requirements/statement/state/range -based), and 
the evaluation criteria.  It is likely that under these considerations, the degree of partial 
morphism .for many, if not all, previous test logs and results would be further reduced by 
a partial morphism. 
c. General Considerations for Software Product Morphism  
The preceding discussion has not distinguished whether the assigned 
safety level of the modified software has changed from the assigned safety level for the 
previous development.  In the cases where the assigned safety level has been increased, 
the amount of software product from the previous development that can be reused for the 
purposes of certification of the modified software would be expected to be significantly 
reduced.  It would be probable that any of the software products to be reused would be 
subject to partial morphism and require additional work to make them suitable for use in 




IV. RELATED WORK 
A. ARCHITECTURAL TRANSFORMATION  
Grunske’s work on the semi-automatic improvement of the nonfunctional 
properties of software using hypergraph transformations [28] is founded on the concept 
of morphisms to modify architectural elements during the design stage of software 
development.  This work compliments the approach proposed in this thesis by providing 
a technique to assess a given system’s architecture for its ability to achieve specified 
requirements for software quality such as system safety.  The technique provides an 
assessment of whether the software architecture complies with stated requirements for 
software quality, or requires alteration to meet system requirements. 
It is cost effective to continually conduct evaluations of the nonfunctional 
properties of a system from the earliest possible opportunity.  Grunske proposes a method 
for semi-automatically conducting a comparison of nonfunctional properties of a system 
with different architectures of the required components.  The comparison begins with an 
architectural specification that satisfies the entire set of functional requirements, and then 
continues with alternative architectural elements that are available in the analysis tool.  If 
the evaluation determines that a nonfunctional requirement is unachievable to the desired 
level, such as safety, then the architectural specification must be transformed to one that 
achieves the quality performance requirements without compromising the attainment of 
functional requirements.  If no impediments to nonfunctional properties are identified, 
then the development process can proceed using the originally proposed architectural 
specification. 
1. Hierarchical Typed Hypergraphs 
The work is based on Hierarchical Typed Hypergraph (HTH) theory.  Hypergraph 
theory is an extension of graph theory that permits more than two nodes (vertices) to an 
edge.  Typed hypergraphs are a restriction within general hypergraphs that stipulates 
node and hyperedge types; hyperedges of a certain type may only connect nodes of 




hyperedges called complex hyperedges that are themselves hypergraphs.  This permits a 
recursive construction of a full HTH using a lesser HTH, hyperedges and nodes. 
A HTH is characterized by the tuple , , , , ,V E att lab ext cts  where: 
V is a finite set of nodes (vertices) from the set of node types LV, 
E is a finite set of hyperedges from the set of hyperedge types LE, 
att is the attachment function to assign a sequence of nodes to a hyperedge, 
lab is the labeling function for nodes and hyperedges, 
ext describes a sequence of external nodes, and 
cts is an assignment function that specifies that a hyperedge contains a HTH. 
2. Unified Modeling Language for Real-Time 
Grunske applies his theory to architectures specified using the Unified Modeling 
Language for Real-Time (UML-RT).  To do so, he derives the UML-RT metaclass 
capsule from the HTH metaclass hypergraph, the UML-RT metaclass port (both end and 
relay types) to the HTH metaclass node, and the UML-RT metaclass connector to the 
HTH metaclass hyperedge.  Figure 4 presents these relationships. 
 
Figure 4. Metaclass Mapping of HTH and UML-RT Elements (From: [28]) 
3. Hierarchical Typed Hypergraphs Transformations 
Hypergraph transformation is achieved by identifying sub-hypergraphs within 
hypergraphs to enable hypergraph subtraction, hypergraph addition to construct an 





hyperedges to complete the reconstruction.  A HTH morphism (m) from one HTH (G) to 
a functionally equivalent HTH (G’), uses pairs of mappings for nodes and hyperedges.  
For instance, : ' ,V Em G G m m→ =< > where : 'Vm V V→ and : 'Em E E→ . 
The graphical T-notation represented in Figure 5 is used to identify the operands 
of the transformation as follows: 
1. Ports (nodes) and connections (hyperedges) in the lower left corner of the 
T are to be subtracted from the original HTH. 
2. Ports and connections (and in the case of Figure 5, new additional 
components) in the lower right corner of the T are to be added to the HTH. 
3. Ports above the T are retained in the architectural transformation. 
4. Morphisms of the attachments between ports and connections reconfigure 
the resultant architecture to retain functional equivalence with the original 
architecture. 
The example presented in Figure 5 shows a single capsule on the left being 
replaced with a subsystem that has three capsules7 on the right, that provide their output 
to a voting capsule that chooses which of the messages to use based on a two-out-of-three 
voting system. 
 
Figure 5. Hypergraph Graphical T-Notation (From: [28]) 
                                                 





4. Evaluation of Quality Characteristics 
Each element of an architectural specification is annotated with the relevant 
aspects of the quality characteristics of interest and the capsules extended with analysis 
models to facilitate the architectural evaluation. For example, to evaluate reliability or 
safety, the elements will be annotated with failure data (safe and unsafe), and extended 
with a fault tree analysis model. 
Architectural transformations can then step through a pre-defined library of 
possible transformations and be evaluated for performance against the nonfunctional 
properties of concern. 
B. COMPUTER-AIDED SOFTWARE EVOLUTION  
Harn [29] extends the use of hypergraphs to a relational hypergraph model as a 
means for formaly defining software evolution.  This was done by relating software 
evolution objects as inputs and outputs of the software steps that use and produce the 
objects.  A hypergraph capturing this relationship is defined in [29] as the tuple 
, , ,N E I O  where: 
N is a set of nodes representing software evolution objects, 
E is a set of hyperedges representing steps during software evolution, 
I is the set of inputs for each hyperedge, and 
O is the set of outputs from each hyperedge. 
In a relational hypergraph, every input node on a hyperedge is either a primary, or 
a secondary input to the hyperedge, and the output of the step is dependent on all input 
nodes.  Primary-input-driven hypergraphs relate different versions of the same software 
evolution object, while secondary-input-driven hypergraphs relate different software 
evolution objects.  Figure 6 shows an example of a relational hypergraph where the 
output software product (P2.2) is produced as a new (and merged) version of earlier 







A primary-input-driven path addresses the evolution history of a software 
evolution component based on the change from an old version to a new 
version. A secondary-input-driven path addresses the evolution rationale 
with a sequence of the software evolution components. Therefore, these 
two structures form the relational hypergraph which determines not only 
what to evolve but also how to evolve it. [29] 
 
 
Figure 6. Relational Hypergraph (From: [29]) 
The functional notation using abstract algebra proposed in this thesis has the 
following similarities to the relational hypergraph model presented in Harn’s dissertation: 
1. The use of the function operator for software development activities 
presented in Equation 5 is similar to the use of hyperedges as steps of 
software evolution. 
2. Software products being identified as the operands of development 
activities is equivalent to nodes representing input software evolution 
objects to software evolution steps. 
3. Software product being produced as the outputs from development 
activities equate nodes representing software evolution objects as outputs 
from steps. 
Harn’s work contrasts the work of this thesis, which is a technique for the analysis 
of the suitability of previously developed software product for reuse, when the software 
and the standards being applied are both evolving.  As previously mentioned, this reuse 





The work in [29] covers the deliberate reuse of software evolution objects during 
software development.  Although Harn does not mention software assurance certification 
as one of the steps of software evolution, the tool that was developed could be extended 
to incorporate certification. 
C. F/RF-111C AGM-142E/1760 INTEGRATION 
The AGM-142E/1760 Integration as part of the F/RF-111C Block C4 SCS 
upgrade was initially thought to be candidate for application of the technique proposed in 
this thesis.  Unfortunately, the software for the System Interface Processor (SIP) is not an 
example of legacy safety-critical software that was having its certification basis upgraded 
during modification. 
AGM-142E/1760 Integration involves both the modification of software for 
several processors8  already embedded in the F/RF-111C and incorporation of a SIP. The 
SIP provides the necessary interface between the MC and AGM-142E loaded onto 
aircraft Weapon Stations (WS) which was not possible through the existing SMP 
interface to the WS.  The certification basis for the existing subsystems was to remain a 
tailored version of MIL-STD-498, while DO-178B (software level B) was proposed as 
the certification basis for the SIP software.  Figure 7 is a simplified block diagram 
showing the data and control connections between system components post integration.   
The software units within the SIP are the operating system, bus driver, discrete 
input/output driver, analog to digital converter driver which were COTS products and the 
OFP which was a completely new software development. 
                                                 
8 Mission Computer (MC), Stores Management Processor (SMP) Bus Sub-System Integration Unit, 



















Figure 7. AGM-142E Integration – Simplified Block Diagram 
Certifying COTS components as part of a DO-178B certified system is a related 
but distinct problem from that of upgrading the certification basis for previously 
developed software.  Certification of COTS products is well recognized within DO-178B 
and guidance to achieve the desired certification is included within the standard. 
The possibility of applying abstract algebra to describe the development of the 
OFP existed but was not explored.  The reason for not investigating this project further 
was that the OFP was a new development and hence no software products existed from a 





























A. KEY FINDINGS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
In this thesis we investigated the ADF practice of certifying modified legacy 
software to DO-178B where the modification is developed in compliance with DO-178B, 
but where the software was previously developed to some other standard.  The ADF 
practice is based on an extension of the FAA policy for certification of software to DO-
178B, which has been previously developed to an earlier version of the DO-178 standard, 
and subsequently modified in such a manner as to be compliant with DO-178B. 
The original scope of the research was to examine the objectives of DO-178B and 
make a comparison with another software assurance or development standard to see how 
much of the previous software development activities and products could possibly 
comply with the certification requirements of DO-178B.  If sufficient software products 
and activities are found to be satisfactory, then some form of automation of any technique 
to reuse the software products from a previous development would be necessary to make 
such reuse practical.  A necessary first step in achieving automation of any software 
product reuse is to define a mathematical description of software evolution to enable the 
mapping of applicable software activities and products between software standards.  
Thus, deriving such a mathematical description of software development and evolution 
became the primary focus of this work. 
In this thesis, we introduced an algebraic model for software development as a 
means to apply a systematic approach to define software development and evolution.  
Our algebraic model introduces the application of abstract algebra to software 
development by defining software products as the set of symbols, and software 
development activities as the set of operations. 
The abstract algebra model has a function notation that defines software 
development activities.  This function notation was developed for a single activity, 
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Equation 7. Software Development 
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Equation 8. Software Evolution 
To assist in the efficient achievement of recertification against new or evolving 
standards, we demonstrated the application of morphism to map software products for 
reuse during software evolution.  Three general functions that were presented are (i) the 
identity function for software product that can be reused without additional effort, (ii) the 
partial function for software product that is only partially reusable and (iii) the null 
function for software product that cannot be reused to achieve recertification. 
( )t tφ α α→  
Equation 9. Identity Morphism 
( )t tφ α δα→  
Equation 10. Partial Morphism 
( )tφ α →∅  
Equation 11. Null Morphism 
Whilst the model presented in this thesis is yet to be completed, and specific 
morphisms for mapping software products are still to be identified, the approach has been 




B. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A comment raised towards the end of this work was in essence a question of 
“does it really matter once a system is in service?”  Mapping prior activities and software 
products to a new software assurance standard does not, on its own, make a safety-critical 
system any safer:  to make software-intensive systems safer, the code must be improved.  
This is a valid assertion but the reply to this point is that software safety assurance is an 
attempt to obtain a measure of the confidence in the safety aspects of a software-intensive 
system. 
Establishing the current level of software safety assurance based on existing 
available evidence permits program managers to make justifiable decisions concerning 
the continued operation, or otherwise, of aircraft with or without software upgrades.  The 
first step in the decision-making process is to determine the current level of software 
safety assurance.  If the finding gives the certification authority sufficient grounds for 
claiming an acceptable level of system safety has been achieved, then the system can 
continue to be operated without any further expenditure or effort.  This prevents 
unwarranted expenditure of resources on software evolution that is not necessary from 
the software safety certification perspective.  If the finding does not satisfy the 
certification authority, then the following options can be explored to reach a decision.  
The first option is always do nothing and continue to operate the system as-is.  This 
sounds unpalatable when talking about safety, but is none-the-less one of the options.  A 
decision to take this option can either be an educated or uneducated one; determining the 
current level of software safety assurance gives the decision maker the opportunity to 
make an educated decision.  The second option is to modify the software within the 
system to raise the software safety assurance level.  The third option is to discontinue 
operation of the existing system and replace it.  These last two choices are also better 
made with a clear understanding of a system’s existing level of software assurance.  We 
hope that the technique proposed in this thesis will be effective for obtaining evidence 
from the existing software products, upon which an educated choice about continued 




C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Determine the Morphisms Required for Activities and Products 
The immediate work to be continued is the identification of a complete set of 
morphisms needed to map the requirements of a legacy standard such as MIL-STD-498 
to the objectives of the desired standard DO-178B.  Completeness of the set of 
morphisms will be achieved when the requirements of the desired standard that can be 
achieved with the legacy software products are identified by appropriate morphisms. 
2. Case Studies 
A candidate for investigation and application of the proposed technique is the 
AF/A-18 software development being undertaken by the RAAF at the Tactical Fighter 
Weapon System Support Unit.  The MC and SMP OFP for the AF/A-18 is an active area 
of the evolution of legacy software which was originally developed to MIL-STD-498.  
The aircraft will be subject to continued software maintenance and modernization and has 
sufficient remaining useful life to warrant the investigation into upgrading the software 
certification basis. 
Other possibilities within the ADF might be the RAAF F/RF-111C MC and SMP 
software development which currently have a MIL-STD-498 certification basis; or 
software support for the Royal Australian Navy’s Super Seasprite helicopters, FFG 
Frigates or Collins class submarines. 
3. Automation 
We feel that the model and notation for the representation of software 
development, evolution and recognition of prior software product presented in this thesis 
is amenable to automation through the development of extensions to existing software 
development tools. 
4. Different Combinations of Other Standards 
The original focus of this thesis was a comparative analysis of the DO-178B 
objectives and MIL-STD-498 requirements to determine the amount of MIL-STD-498 





5. Application to Other Domains and Dimensions 
The methodology presented in this thesis can be applied to other domains that 
have safety-critical concerns.  These include rail system automation, nuclear power plant 
control and medical devices. 
Another dimension of high assurance software that might benefit from the 
application of this technique is software security certification. 
It is possible that the approach introduced here may also be applied to other 
engineering disciplines that are concerned with recertification. 
6. Cost-Benefit Analysis With Respect to Software/System Age 
Achieving certification to a new standard is a considerable effort with significant 
costs.  It is important therefore, to obtain an acceptable ROI.  One could explore whether 
the cost of recertification would diminish as a system gets closer to the end of its service 
life.  Cost-benefit analysis of recertification of a system as a function of the remaining 




























APPENDIX: EXTRACTS FROM SELECTED STANDARDS 
A. EXTRACTS FROM RTCA DO-178B 
12.0 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
12.1 Use of Previously Developed Software 
The guidelines of this subsection discuss the issues associated with the use 
of previously developed software, including assessment of modifications, 
the effect of changing an aircraft installation, application environment, or 
development environment, upgrading a development baseline, and SCM 
and SQA considerations.  The intention to use previously developed 
software is stated in the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification. 
12.1.1 Modifications to Previously Developed Software 
This guidance discusses modifications to previously developed software 
where the outputs of the previous software life cycle processes comply 
with this document.  Modification may result from requirement changes, 
the detection of errors, and/or software enhancements.  Analysis activities 
for proposed modifications include: 
a. The revised outputs of the system safety assessment process should be 
reviewed considering the proposed modifications. 
b. If the software level is revised, the guidelines of paragraph 12.1.4 should 
be considered. 
c. But the impact of the software requirements changes and the impact of 
software architecture changes should be analyzed, including the 
consequences of software requirement changes upon other requirements 
and coupling between several software components that may result in 
reverification effort involving more than the modified area. 
d. The area affected by change should be determined.  This may be done by 
data flow analysis, control flow analysis, timing analysis and traceability 
analysis. 
e. Areas affected by the change should be reverified considering the 
guidelines of section 6. 
12.1.4 Upgrading a Development Baseline 
Guidelines follow for software whose software life cycle data from a 
previous application are determined to be inadequate or do not satisfy the 




new application.  These guidelines are intended to aid in the acceptance 
of: 
• Commercial off-the-shelf software. 
• Airborne software developed to other guidelines. 
• Airborne software developed prior to the existence of this 
document. 
• Software previously developed to this document at a lower 
software level 
Guidance for upgrading a development baseline includes: 
a. The objectives of this document should be satisfied while taking advantage 
of software lifecycle data of the previous development that satisfy the 
objectives for the new application. 
b. Software aspects of certification should be based on the failure conditions 
and software level(s) as determined by the system safety assessment 
process. Comparison to failure conditions of the previous application will 
determine areas which may need to be upgraded. 
c. Software life cycle data from a previous development should be evaluated 
to ensure that the software verification process objectives of the software 
level are satisfied for the new application. 
d. Reverse engineering may be used to regenerate software life cycle data 
that is inadequate or missing in satisfying the objectives of this document.  
In addition to producing the software product, additional activities may 
need to be performed to satisfy the software verification process 
objectives. 
e. If use of product service history is planned to satisfy the objectives of this 
document in upgrading a development baseline, the guidelines of 
paragraph 12.3.5 should be considered. 
f. The applicant should specify the strategy for accomplishing compliance 
with this document in the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification. 
12.1.5 Software Configuration Management Considerations 
If previously developed software is used, the software configuration 
management process for the new application should include, in addition to 
the guidelines of section 7: 
a. Traceability from the software product and software life cycle data of the 
previous application to the new application. 
b. Change control that enables problem reporting, problem resolution, and 





12.1.6 Software Quality Assurance Considerations 
If previously developed software is used, the software quality assurance 
process for the new application should include, in addition to the 
guidelines of section 8: 
a. Assurance that the software components satisfy or exceed the software life 
cycle criteria of the software level for the new application. 
b. Assurance that changes to the software life cycle processes are stated in 
the software plans. 
12.3.5 Product Service History 
If equivalent safety for the software can be demonstrated by the use of the 
software’s product service history, some certification credit may be 
granted.  The acceptability of this method is dependent on: 
• Configuration management of the software. 
• Effectiveness of problems reporting activity. 
• Stability and maturity of the software. 
• Relevance of product service history environment. 
• Actual error rates and product service history. 
• Impact of modifications. 
 
Guidance for the use of product service history includes: 
a. The applicant should show that the software and associated evidence used 
to comply with system safety objectives have been under configuration 
management throughout the product service history. 
b. The applicant should show that the problem reporting during the product 
service history provides assurance that representative data is available and 
that in-service problems were reported and recorded, and are retrievable. 
c. Configuration changes during the product service history should be 
identified and the effect analyzed to confirm the stability and maturity of 
the software.  Uncontrolled changes to the Executable Object Code during 
the product service history may invalidate the use of product service 
history. 
d. The intended software usage should be analyzed to show the relevance of 
the product service history. 
e. If the operating environments of the existing and proposed applications 
differ, additional software verification should confirm compliance with the 






f. The analysis of configuration changes and product service history 
environment may require the use of software requirements and designed 
data to confirm the applicability of the product service history 
environment. 
g. If the software is a subset of the software that was active during the service 
period, Then analysis should confirm the equivalency of the new 
environment with the previous environment, and determine those software 
components that were not executed during normal operation 
 Note: Additional verification may be needed to confirm compliance with 
the system safety objectives for those components. 
h. The problem report history should be analyzed to determine how safety-
related problems occurred and which problems were corrected. 
i. Those problems that are indicative of an inadequate process, such as 
design or code errors, should be indicated separately from those whose 
cause are outside the scope of this document, such as hardware or system 
requirements errors. 
j. The data described above and these items should be specified in the Plan 
for Software Aspects of Certification: 
(1) Analysis of the relevance of the product service history 
environment. 
(2) Length of service period and rationale for calculating the 
number of hours in the service, including factors such as 
operational modes, the number of independently operating 
copies in the installation and in service, and the definition of 
“ normal operation” and “ normal operation time”. 
(3) Definition of what was counted as an error and rationale for 
that definition. 
(4) Proposed acceptable error rates and rationale for the product 
service history period in relation to the system safety and 
proposed error rates. 
k. If the error rate is greater than that identified in the plan, these errors 





ANNEX A (of DO-178B) 




Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
Software Planning Process 
1 Software development and 



































2 Transition criteria, inter-
relationships and sequencing 
among processes are 
defined. 
4.1b 
4.3 ○ ○ ○
      
3 Software life cycle 
environment is defined. 
4.1c ○ ○ ○       
4 Additional considerations 
are addressed. 
4.1d ○ ○ ○ ○       
5 Software development 
standards are defined. 
4.1e 
○ ○ ○
S/W Requirements Stds 
S/W Design Stds 














6 Software plans comply with 
RTCA DO-178B. 
4.1f 
4.6 ○ ○ ○
SQA Records 










7 Software plans are 
coordinated. 
4.1g 
4.6 ○ ○ ○
SQA Records 










Software Development Processes 
8 High-level requirements are 
developed. 
5.1.1a ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Requirements Data 11.9 1 1 1 1
9 Derived high-level 
requirements are defined. 
5.1.1b ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Requirements Data 11.9 1 1 1 1
10 Software architecture is 
developed. 
5.2.1a ○ ○ ○ ○ Design Description 11.10 1 1 2 2
11 Low-level requirements are 
developed. 
5.2.1a ○ ○ ○ ○ Design Description 11.10 1 1 2 2
12 Derived low-level 
requirements are developed. 







Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
13 Source Code is developed. 5.3.1a ○ ○ ○ ○ Source Code 11.11 1 1 1 1
14 Executable Object Code is 
produced and integrated in 
the target computer. 
5.4.1a ○ ○ ○ ○ Executable Object Code 11.12 1 1 1 1
Verification of Outputs of Software Requirements Process 
15 Software high-level 
requirements comply with 
system requirements. 
6.3.1a ● ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2 2
16 High-level requirements are 
accurate and consistent. 
6.3.1b ● ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2 2
17 High-level requirements are 
compatible with target 
computer. 
6.3.1c ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
18 High-level requirements of 
verifiable. 
6.3.1d ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
19 High-level requirements 
conform to standards. 
6.3.1e ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
20 High-level requirements are 
traceable to system 
requirements. 
6.3.1f ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2 2
21 Algorithms are accurate. 6.3.1g ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
Verification of Outputs of Software Design Process 
22 Low-level requirements 
comply with high-level 
requirements. 
6.3.2a ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
23 Lower-level requirements 
are accurate and consistent. 
6.3.2b ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
24 Low-level requirements are 
compatible with target 
computer 
6.3.2c ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
25 Level-level requirements are 
verifiable. 
6.3.2d ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
26 Level-level requirements 
conform to standards. 







Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
27 Level-level requirements are 
traceable to high-level 
requirements. 
6.3.2f ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
28 Algorithms are accurate. 6.3.2g ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
29 Software architecture is 
compatible with high-level 
requirements. 
6.3.3a ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
30 Software architecture is 
consistent. 
6.3.3b ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
31 Software architecture is 
compatible with target 
computer. 
6.3.3c ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
32 Software architecture is 
verifiable. 
6.3.3d ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
33 Software architecture 
conforms to standards. 
6.3.3e ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
34 Software partitioning 
integrity is confirmed. 
6.3.3f ● ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2 2
Verification of Outputs of Software Coding & Integration Processes 
35 Source Code complies with 
low-level requirements. 
6.3.4a ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
36 Source Code complies with 
software architecture. 
6.3.4b ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
37 Source Code is verifiable. 6.3.4c ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
38 Source Code conforms to 
standards. 
6.3.4d ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
39 Source Code is traceable to 
low-level requirements. 
6.3.4e ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
40 Source Code is accurate and 
consistent. 
6.3.4f ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
41 Output of integration 
process is complete and 
correct. 







Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
Testing of Outputs of Integration Process 
42 Executable Object Code 




○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Cases and Procedures 
















43 Executable Object Code is 




○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Cases and Procedures 
















44 Executable Object Code 




● ● ○ S/W  Verification Cases and Procedures 














45 Executable Object Code is 




● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Cases and Procedures 














46 Executable Object Code is 
compatible with target 
computer. 
6.4.3a ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Cases and Procedures 
















Verification of Verification Process Results 
47 Test procedures are correct. 6.3.6b ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
48 Test results are correct and 
discrepancies explained. 
6.3.6c ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
49 Test coverage of high-level 
requirements is achieved. 
6.4.4.1 ● ○ ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2 2
50 Test coverage of low-level 
requirements is achieved. 
6.4.4.1 ● ○ ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  




6.4.4.2 ● S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2    
52 Test coverage of software 
structure (decision 
coverage) is achieved. 
6.4.4.2a
6.4.4.2b
● ● S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2   
53 Test coverage of software 
structure (statement 
coverage) is achieved. 
6.4.4.2a
6.4.4.2b







Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
54 Test coverage of software 
structure (data coupling and 
control coupling) is 
achieved. 
6.4.4.2c ● ● ○ S/W  Verification Results 11.14 2 2 2  
Software Configuration Management Process 
55 Configuration items are 
identified. 
7.2.1 ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Configuration Management Records 
11.18 2 2 2 2
56 Baselines and trace ability 
are established. 
7.2.2 ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Configuration Index 












57 Problem reporting, change 
control, change review, and 
configuration status 





○ ○ ○ ○ Problem Reports 












58 Archive, retrieval, and 
release are established. 
7.2.7 ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Configuration Management Records 
11.18 2 2 2 2
59 Software load control is 
established. 
7.2.8 ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Configuration Management Records 
11.18 2 2 2 2
60 Software life cycle 
environment control is 
established. 
7.2.9 ○ ○ ○ ○ S/W  Life Cycle Environment Configuration 
Index 






















Software Quality Assurance Process 
61 Assurance is obtained that 
software development and 
integral processes comply 
with approved software 
plans and standards. 
8.1a ● ● ● ● S/W  Quality Assurance Records 
11.19 2 2 2 2
62 Assurance is obtained that 
transition criteria for the 
software lifecycle processes 
are satisfied. 
8.1b ● ● S/W  Quality Assurance Records 
11.19 2 2   




● ● ● ● S/W  Quality Assurance Records 







Output CC by 
S/W Level
 Description Ref. A B C D Description Ref. A B C D
Certification Liaison Process 
64 Communication and 
understanding between the 
applicant and the 
certification authority is 
established. 
9.0 ○ ○ ○ ○ PSAC 11.1 1 1 1 1
65 The means of compliance is 
proposed and agreement 
with the Plan for Software 
Aspects of Certification is 
obtained. 
9.1 ○ ○ ○ ○ PSAC 11.1 1 1 1 1
66 Compliance substantiation is 
provided 






1 1 1 1
Legend 
○ The objective should be satisfied. 
● The objective should be satisfied with independence. 
Blank Satisfaction of objective is at applicant’s discretion. 
1 Data satisfies the objectives of Control Category 1 (CC1). 
2 Data satisfies the objectives of Control Category 2 (CC2). 
Table 4. Objectives, Activities, Outputs and Data Control Categories 
(After: 15, Tables A-1 through A-10) 
B. EXTRACTS FROM MIL-STD-498 
4.2.2 Standards for software products. The developer shall develop and 
apply standards for representing requirements, design, code, test cases, test 
procedures, and test results. These standards shall be described in, or 
referenced from, the software development plan. 
5.16 Software quality assurance. The developer shall perform software 
quality assurance in accordance with the following requirements. 
Note: If a system or CSCI is developed in multiple builds, the activities 
and software products of each build should be evaluated in the context of 
the objectives established for that build. An activity or software product 




missing aspects designated for later builds. Planning for software quality 
assurance is included in software development planning (see 5.1.1). 
5.16.1 Software quality assurance evaluations. The developer shall 
conduct on-going evaluations of software development activities and the 
resulting software products to: 
a. Assure that each activity required by the contract or described in the 
software development plan is being performed in accordance with the 
contract and with the software development plan. 
b. Assure that each software product required by this standard or by other 
contract provisions exists and has undergone software product evaluations, 
testing, and corrective action as required by this standard and by other 
contract provisions. 
5.16.2 Software quality assurance records. The developer shall prepare 
and maintain records of each software quality assurance activity. These 
records shall be maintained for the life of the contract. Problems in 
software products under project-level or higher configuration control and 
problems in activities required by the contract or described in the software 
development plan shall be handled as described in 5.17 (Corrective 
action). 
5.16.3 Independence in software quality assurance. The persons 
responsible for conducting software quality assurance evaluations shall not 
be the persons who developed the software product, performed the 
activity, or are responsible for the software product or activity. This does 
not preclude such persons from taking part in these evaluations. The 
persons responsible for assuring compliance with the contract shall have 
the resources, responsibility, authority, and organizational freedom to 
permit objective software quality assurance evaluations and to initiate and 
verify corrective actions. 
C. EXTRACT FROM DATA ITEM DESCRIPTION DI-IPSC-81433 
(SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION) 
3.7 Safety requirements. This paragraph shall specify the CSCI 
requirements, if any, concerned with preventing or minimizing unintended 
hazards to personnel, property, and the physical environment. Examples 
include safeguards the CSCI must provide to prevent inadvertent actions 
(such as accidentally issuing an "auto pilot off" command) and non-
actions (such as failure to issue an intended "auto pilot off" command). 
This paragraph shall include the CSCI requirements, if any, regarding 
nuclear components of the system, including, as applicable, prevention of 
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